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ABSTRACT
Voice control is a popular way to operate mobile devices,
enabling users to communicate requests to their devices.
However, adversaries can leverage voice control to trick mo-
bile devices into executing commands to leak secrets or to
modify critical information. Contemporary mobile operat-
ing systems fail to prevent such attacks because they do
not control access to the speaker at all and fail to control
when untrusted apps may use the microphone, enabling au-
thorized apps to create exploitable communication channels.
In this paper, we propose a security mechanism that tracks
the creation of audio communication channels explicitly and
controls the information flows over these channels to pre-
vent several types of attacks. We design and implement
AuDroid, an extension to the SELinux reference monitor in-
tegrated into the Android operating system for enforcing
lattice security policies over the dynamically changing use
of system audio resources. To enhance flexibility, when in-
formation flow errors are detected, the device owner, system
apps and services are given the opportunity to resolve infor-
mation flow errors using known methods, enabling AuDroid
to run many configurations safely. We evaluate our approach
on 17 widely-used apps that make extensive use of the micro-
phone and speaker, finding that AuDroid prevents six types
of attack scenarios on audio channels while permitting all
17 apps to run effectively. AuDroid shows that it is possible
to prevent attacks using audio channels without compro-
mising functionality or introducing significant performance
overhead.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4 [Operating Systems]; D.4.6 [Security and Protec-
tion]: Access Controls, Information Flow Controls.
Keywords
Mobile Systems Security, Authorization, Information Flow.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones and wearable devices have changed the way
people interact with computers. Where PCs require the key-
board and mouse to communicate, smartphones and wear-
ables enable interaction using other inputs, such as voice
control. For example, voice-activated ”personal assistants”
offer to help us with basic tasks in a hands-free way, includ-
ing Siri and Google Now. Other apps leverage the speaker
and microphone on such devices for other purposes, such as
voice messaging, phone call recording, and voice notes.
Unfortunately, adversaries may leverage access to the mi-
crophone or speaker to launch a variety of attacks against
apps and system services. Unauthorized voice recording has
long been known to be a serious security issue. For example,
a malicious app may try to steal secret information commu-
nicated to the smartphone [16] (e.g., passwords entered by
voice) or generated by the smartphone [17] (e.g., text con-
verted to speech) by recording such information surrepti-
tiously using the smartphone’s microphone [4]. In addition,
a malicious app may replay recorded or generated informa-
tion using the device’s speaker to gain access to other secret
information (e.g., through manufactured ”voice” commands)
or otherwise control the behavior of the device [4, 24]. Fi-
nally, even external adversaries, such as a user different from
the device owner or in proximity mobile devices, may attack
the smartphone by submitting commands, tricking smart-
phone apps and services into releasing secret information or
modifying the device in an unauthorized way.
Researchers have explored a variety of possible solutions
to prevent these attacks, but none of them is sufficient to
completely prevent exploitation of mobile devices. Research-
ers have proposed modifying individual apps to prevent at-
tacks from untrusted input to the microphone, such as the
Google Voice Search app [4], but such techniques are app-
specific and lack visibility into the system necessary to de-
termine whether an attack is possible. SemaDroid [5] en-
ables users to control the quality of sensor data collected
and/or replace sensor data with mock data to prevent pri-
vacy leaks, but such countermeasures may impact the ef-
fectiveness of apps. Researchers have also enhanced smart-
phones with access control systems that enforce mandatory
access control [18, 28] (MAC), reason about trusted paths
with users [3, 6], and enable app-aware MAC [1], but these
systems do not reason about the communication channels
created by individual accesses, failing to prevent the attacks
above.
The aim of this work is to control communication chan-
nels created when apps and services use the microphone and
speaker to prevent system apps (including services) from
leaking secret information or being used as a confused deputy
[26]. In theory, these attacks can be prevented by enforcing
lattice security policies over these channels [11]. By enforc-
ing simple two-level lattices for secrecy and integrity, we can
prevent data in system apps and services from being leaked
to untrusted parties (e.g., third-party apps) and prevent sys-
tem apps and services from using data from untrusted par-
ties, respectively.
However, there are two major challenges in enforcing such
policies. First, processes may take ownership of the micro-
phone and/or speaker dynamically, creating communication
channels that may enable exploitation. We identify three
distinct types of communication channels that must be con-
trolled: (1) a channel from the device’s speaker to its micro-
phone; (2) a channel from the device’s speaker to external
parties who may be eavesdropping on the device; and (3) a
channel from external parties, who may be trying to trick
the device, to the device’s microphone. Any defense must
track the creation and deletion of such channels and rea-
son about the information flows created by such channels
to prevent exploits. Second, enforcing a lattice policy may
be too strict for some apps, such as where users want to al-
low data to be captured by third-party apps. In such cases,
we take two distinct approaches, depending on whether the
channel may compromise the security of a system app/ser-
vice or the device owner. For system apps and services, we
leverage available methods to resolve information flow errors
in audio channels by declassifying or endorsing unsafe com-
munications, which we collectively call (information flow)
resolvers. However, the effectiveness of resolvers may be
application-specific, so we propose a method for negotiating
the choice of resolvers using callbacks, motivated by the use
of callbacks to enforce access control from Android Secu-
rity Modules [1]. For users, we construct a trusted path to
the Android operating system to notify the user of unsafe
flows and obtain user approval of such flows, motivated by
the creation of trusted paths for individual applications in
user-driven access control [3, 6].
In this paper, we design and implement AuDroid, an ex-
tension to the SELinux reference monitor integrated into
the Android OS to enforce lattice policies over the dynami-
cally changing use of system audio resources, and enlist in-
put from system apps and services to evaluate options for
resolving unsafe communication channels. Specifically, we
have integrated AuDroid into the Android Media Server to
enable it to control access to the microphone and speaker
to enforce a simple lattice policy that aims to protect sys-
tem apps from third-party apps and external attackers. We
evaluate AuDroid on six types of attack scenarios described
in section 2.2, including both previously published and new
attacks. We evaluate AuDroid on 17 widely-used apps that
leverage audio to verify that AuDroid, when enhanced with
available resolvers, prevents exploits without impairing the
normal functionality of such system apps and services. We
find that, as discussed in Section 6, AuDroid provides such
defense for less than 4 µs for the speaker and less than 25µs
for the microphone, even including visual notification, lead-
ing to insignificant overhead during app usage.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We classify six types of attack scenarios that may lever-
age system audio resources to exploit system apps and
services or the device owner, two of which are new
Figure 1: Android OS Architecture
types of attacks we identify in this paper.
• To prevent these types of attacks, we propose Au-
Droid, an extension to the SELinux reference monitor
to enforce lattice security policies over three types of
dynamically-created, audio communication channels.
AuDroid adapts prior research that callbacks to apps
and trusted paths to leverage available methods for re-
solving information flow errors, which we call resolvers,
to permit restricted use of unsafe audio channels and
prevent exploitation.
• We evaluate our approach on 17 widely-used apps that
make extensive use of the microphone and speaker,
finding that AuDroid prevents all the discussed attack
scenarios on audio channels while permitting all 17 ap-
plications to run effectively.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Contemporary mobile operating systems do not provide
mechanisms to manage audio streams securely. The main
reason is because accesses to microphone and speaker, by dif-
ferent processes, are not considered security-sensitive. Cur-
rently, such operating systems only control access to the
microphone, allowing authorized apps to access the micro-
phone at any time, even when a privileged app may be using
the speaker or the user may be speaking a sensitive passcode
to the device. Consequently, current mobile operating sys-
tems fail in enforcing information flow control through the
microphone and speaker, resulting in putting the users’ data
confidentiality and device integrity at risk.
In this paper, we focus on Android OS due to its open
source availability and its wide adoption in the mobile de-
vice market [19]. Without lack of generality, these observa-
tions could be extended to other mobile operating systems,
currently adopted by millions of users worldwide, such as
iOS and Windows Phone.
2.1 Audio Stream Management in Android OS
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the Android system
and how Android apps request access to audio devices. Both
Android system apps (distributed with the OS) and market
apps (installed by the device owner) obtain access to An-
droid system resources through requests via the SDK API
to the system services in the Android System Services layer.
In general, such system services use the Android Hardware
Abstraction Layer (HAL) to obtain control of devices from
the Linux kernel. For example, through the HAL library
the Android Media Server directly communicates with the
underlying Linux kernel to read and write Linux device (i.e.,
/dev) files. SELinux rules on the Android system are config-
ured to permit only the Media Server to access the specific
Figure 2: Six different types of attack scenarios
Linux device files for the speaker (/dev/snd/pcmC0D15p) and
the microphone (/dev/snd/pcmC0D0c). Therefore, the pro-
cess running the Media Server is the only one allowed to
directly access the microphone and speaker.
Currently, the Android system only controls apps’ ac-
cess to the microphone device, not the speaker. The Media
Server uses the Android permission mechanism to authorize
access to system resources. To access the microphone, apps
need to declare the following security permission, <uses-
permission android:name="android.permission.RECORD_
AUDIO"/>, in their AndroidManifest.xml file [25]. This per-
mission is validated by the Package Manager, a module of
the Android framework, both at app installation time and
each time the app requests access to the microphone. If an
app attempts to access the microphone without specifying
the permission in the manifest file, the Package Manager
throws a security exception and terminates the app execu-
tion. On the other hand, to access the speaker no specific
security permission needs to be declared by apps, so any app
can use the speaker any time it is available.
2.2 Audio Channels and Attack Scenarios
Audio channels enable one principal who is sending audio
signals to communicate with another principal who receives
these signals. Normally, apps and services use audio chan-
nels to communicate with external parties. For example,
apps and services may use the microphone to receive com-
mands from the device owner and may use the speaker to
play music or produce sounds directed to the device owner.
Given that smartphones have a microphone and a speaker
and communicate with external parties, we identify the fol-
lowing three types of audio channels that may be created:
• Channel Type 1 - from the device’s speaker to the
device’s microphone.
• Channel Type 2 - from the device’s speaker to an
external party (e.g., user or other device).
• Channel Type 3 - from an external party (e.g., user
or other device) to the device’s microphone.
Unfortunately, audio channels may also be misused to
compromise the secrecy of the device owner or trick the de-
vice into performing unauthorized operations (i.e., use the
Media Server as a confused deputy [26]). Figure 2 shows
six different ways that audio channels may be exploited, as
detailed below1.
• Attack Scenario 1. A malicious process uses the
device’s speaker to produce input, such as malicious
voice commands, to trick a benign (victim) process
1Scenarios where other devices are the external parties can
be reduced to one of the six attack scenarios identified.
using the device’s microphone into acting as a confused
deputy [26].
• Attack Scenario 2. A malicious process uses the
device’s microphone to eavesdrop on the output from
the device’s speaker, produced by a benign process,
and record security-sensitive information.
• Attack Scenario 3. A malicious process uses the
device’s speaker to send input to external parties, such
as another mobile device or the user, to trick them into
acting as a confused deputy.
• Attack Scenario 4. In this scenario both ends are
malicious. A malicious process sends secret informa-
tion from the device’s speaker that may be received by
a malicious external party listening to the device.
• Attack Scenario 5. A malicious external party pro-
duces input, such as malicious voice commands, to
trick a benign process using the device’s microphone
into acting as a confused deputy.
• Attack Scenario 6. A malicious process uses the
device’s microphone to eavesdrop on external parties,
such as the device owner.
These six types of attack scenarios represent one eavesdrop-
ping and one confused deputy attack for each of the three
types of audio channels. Researchers have previously identi-
fied how some of these attacks may be realized. Diao et al.
[4] demonstrate how a malicious app bypasses the Touch-
less Voice Authentication, a mechanism that authenticates
the user, to unlock the screen and start the Google Voice
Search (GVS) app by using voice commands (Scenario 1).
Jang et al. [3] show how a keylogger installed on the tar-
get device eavesdrops on the keyboard inputs and steal se-
crets, such as passwords, when typed by the device owner
and spoken out by the TalkBack assistive technology [16]
(Scenario 2). Furthermore, a malicious app could use the
microphone to eavesdrop on the external party to collect
security-sensitive information, such as private conversations
and phone calls. Schlegel et al. [14] show that apps with the
RECORD_AUDIO permission can selectively extract confiden-
tial data (e.g., credit card numbers) and stealthily deliver
them to the adversary (Scenario 6).
Table 1: Security-sensitive Voice Command Examples
Device Voice Command
A
n
d
r
o
id
O
S When’s my next meeting?
Video call Jane using Hangouts
Listen to voicemail
Activate Speak Passwords in accessibility settings
Show me my flights
Send an email to Kristin, subject ..., message, ...
iO
S
Open my Facebook
Call 800 600 1234
What’s going on Twitter?
Read my last email
Show me my pictures
Cancel my morning alarm for tomorrow
A
m
a
z
o
n
E
c
h
o
Alexa, buy this song
Alexa, what’s my commute?
Alexa, turn off Bedroom Switch.
Alexa, send this Voicecast on Sarah’s tablet
In addition, we show that the other three types of at-
tack scenarios listed are also possible. For example, as de-
scribed in Section 6, we developed a malicious app that
plays voice commands (such as those listed in Table 1) to
external parties, specifically other devices, such as other
smartphones, tablets, thermostats, home security systems,
or voice-controlled automobile systems (Scenario 3). We also
developed an app that stealthy eavesdrops voice and sound
through the microphone to collect security-sensitive infor-
mation such as private conversations, successively leaked
to an adversary through the speaker as soon as the device
owner, victim of the attack, is distant from the device (Sce-
nario 4). This is essentially a Trojan horse attack from the
device. Finally, attacks due to a misplaced trust in exter-
nal party’s input are possible whenever a malicious user is
able to send malicious voice commands to system apps or
services (Scenario 5).
2.3 Challenges in Protecting Audio Channels
While researchers have identified the possibility of such
attacks, systematic defenses to prevent such attacks have
not been developed yet. We identify three challenges in pro-
tecting communications via audio channels:
• Mobile devices enable dynamic creation of audio chan-
nels that might not comply with information flow re-
quirements, enabling both eavesdropping and confused
deputy attacks.
• The functional requirements of some apps may violate
information flow requirements, causing errors when tra-
ditional information flow control defenses are used.
• Audio channels may enable communication with ex-
ternal parties, such as other devices and users, whose
identity and intentions may not be known.
Proposed security mechanisms do not address these chal-
lenges. First, several proposed security mechanisms are app-
specific. Researchers propose removing vulnerabilities from
system apps and services, such as Google Voice Search (GVS)
[4], but there are several such system apps and services. Re-
searchers have proposed blocking access to the speaker while
a system service is actively listening for voice commands [4,
3], but this solution may impact usability (prevent playing
of ring tones or notification sounds) and does not address
control of external parties. Researchers have proposed solu-
tions to protect secrecy of sensor information by returning
fake or fuzzed sensor data to apps [5]. While this approach
works reasonably for some sensors, such as GPS and the ac-
celerometer, it does not suffice for audio data as apps require
accurate audio data to perform their tasks. The Android
permission mechanism [25] and Security Enhanced Linux for
Android (SE Android) [18, 28] cannot prevent such attacks.
As discussed above, neither controls access to the speaker
at present. In addition, neither considers audio channels as
objects in need of control. As a result, a malicious app that
has been granted access to the microphone may use that
privilege whenever the microphone is available.
An interesting research proposal is to leverage app-specific
information to augment access control. For example, re-
searchers have proposed using callbacks to app-trusted mod-
ules to evaluate unsafe operations [1, 2] and using trusted
modules to track user interaction with the device [6]. For ex-
ample, the Android Security Modules (ASM) framework [1]
allows apps to register for a callback for specific autho-
rization hooks. However, only the apps using audio chan-
nels should be notified and such callbacks should also en-
able the resolution of information flow errors in addition to
authorization decisions. Also, User-Driven Access Control
(UDAC) [6] enables untrusted apps to choose when to use
trusted modules for the creation of a trusted path. Unfortu-
nately, that requires that the reference monitor to rely on the
app developers to create the trusted paths or risk breaking
functionality. However, we find both the ASM and UDAC
ideas interesting, and propose enhancements that enable ef-
fective control of audio channels.
3. SECURITY MODEL
3.1 Threat Model
In our threat model we consider two sources of threats.
The first source of threats is internal to the mobile device:
processes running market apps installed by the device owner.
We assume that the device owner is not aware of the ma-
liciousness of market apps. The second source of threats
is external to the device: external parties, including users
other than the device owner and other devices. Malicious
apps, users, and devices can perform any of the attacks de-
scribed in Section 2.2: eavesdropping and confused deputy
attacks on the three types of audio channels.
3.2 Trust Model
We assume that the operating system of the target de-
vice (e.g., Linux kernel and Android OS) is booted securely
(e.g., Verified Boot mechanism [22]), runs approved code
from device vendor, is free of malice, and is trusted to pro-
tect itself from the threats above. We assume that system
apps and services run approved code from the device vendor
and are free of malice. Some market apps might contain
native code that may try to gain access to system/hardware
resources. To prevent such native code from being able to
directly access system/hardware resources, we rely on the
use of SELinux [18] running in Enforcing Mode from boot
time. Therefore, only system services can access physical
devices through the use of the Java Native Interface (JNI)
[21]. We assume that SELinux for Android satisfies the ref-
erence monitor concept [27]. Thus, we assume market apps
can only access the microphone and the speaker through the
API provided by the standard Android SDK [20].
4. AuDroid DESIGN
In this section, we detail the design of AuDroid, an exten-
sion to the SELinux reference monitor, for enforcing Multi-
Level Security (MLS) over audio channels created by apps
and system services, while using the microphone and speaker,
to prevent the attacks described in Section 2.2. One key in-
sight of designing AuDroid is to authorize access to all three
types of dynamically-created audio channels highlighted in
Figure 3. AuDroid extends the reference monitor provided by
SELinux by placing 4 additional hooks in the Media Server
to mediate all accesses to the microphone and speaker by
apps and services, compute the audio channels that would
be created by the access, and authorize the resultant infor-
mation flows of those audio channels if they comply with an
MLS policy. A second insight of designing AuDroid is to cre-
ate trusted paths with the device owners, authenticate them
and learn their intentions when attempting to use unsafe
information flows. Additionally, to improve flexibility, Au-
Droid enables the use of available methods to resolve some
information flow errors, which we will call (information flow)
resolvers.
4.1 AuDroid Overview
An overview of the AuDroid design is shown in Figure 3.
AuDroid implements an extension to the reference monitor
provided by SELinux to mediate accesses to the microphone
Figure 3: Overview of the AuDroid Design
and speaker by enhancing the Media Server. The reference
monitor extension is activated upon receiving a request from
a process, i.e., one of the two internal parties (P1 and P2), to
access either the microphone or the speaker (step 1 ). If the
access request is for the microphone, the reference monitor
first checks the Android permissions (step 2 ), as it does
already. Then, the Media Server reasons about which of
the three possible audio channels would be created by con-
sidering the possible external parties (EP3 and EP4), and
identifies the security levels (L1, L2, L3, and L4) associ-
ated with the parties that would communicate as result of
granting access to the microphone or speaker (steps 3 and
4 ), as described in Section 4.2. Subsequently, the Media
Server enforces an MLS policy over the three audio chan-
nels (step 5 ), as described in Section 4.3. If, for all three
audio channels, the corresponding information flows are clas-
sified as safe by the MLS policy, then the access request is
granted and the corresponding audio channels are created
(step 6 ). Otherwise, if an information flow is identified as
unsafe, AuDroid has two ways to determine whether the un-
safe information can be resolved (i.e., made sufficiently safe
to prevent eavesdropping and/or confused deputy attacks).
First, AuDroid proposes a known resolver and requires ap-
proval from the system app or service at risk to verify that
the proposed resolver will protect the system app or service
and enable it to function (step 7 ), as described in Sec-
tion 4.4. In addition, if the unsafe information flows involve
the use of the microphone, AuDroid creates a trusted path for
the device owner to confirm the access to the microphone is
acceptable (e.g., recording is not eavesdropping and/or out-
put is understood to be from a low-integrity source) to the
device owner (step 8 ), as described in Section 4.5. AuDroid
gathers system apps/services and the device owner willing-
ness to be part of the communication channels and accord-
ingly modifies the security levels to resolve information flow
errors. Neither the user nor the system apps/services are
allowed to change the policy under enforcement.
4.2 Identification of Security Levels
In order to mediate accesses to the microphone and speaker,
it is necessary to identify the security levels associated to
the parties involved in all three audio channels. AuDroid
identifies the security levels of each internal party by us-
ing the process ID (PID) specified in the access requests for
the microphone or speaker. AuDroid leverages the conven-
tion used by the Linux kernel in Android OS, according to
which market apps have PID greater than 2001, system apps
have PID between 1001 and 2000, and system services have
PID between 1 and 1000. According to this convention, Au-
Droid identifies system apps and services as high-secrecy and
high-integrity (HS,HI) subjects, market apps are identified
as low-secrecy and low-integrity (LS,LI) subjects.
By default, if an internal party is using the speaker, Au-
Droid identifies the security levels of an external party listen-
ing to the speaker as low-secrecy and high-integrity (L3 =
(LS,HI)). This configuration prevents a system app or ser-
vice from leaking security-sensitive information to an exter-
nal entity different from the device owner, and at the same
time prevents market apps from producing audio that would
mislead the device owner or affect an external, in-proximity
device. On the other hand, if the internal party is using the
microphone, AuDroid identifies the security levels of an ex-
ternal party sending input to the microphone as high-secrecy
and low-integrity (L4 = (HS,LI)). This configuration pre-
vents a market app from eavesdropping the external party,
and at the same time prevents any system app and service
from receiving voice commands from an external party dif-
ferent from the device owner. In both cases, the security
levels of both external parties are elevated to high-secrecy
and high-integrity (L3 = L4 = (HS,HI)) upon authentica-
tion of the owner of the device, as shown in Figure 4. User
authentication is an orthogonal problem to out research ob-
jective. We assume there exists a authentication mechanism.
In the evaluation (Section 6), we use screen lock passcodes
to authenticate device owners. Exploring more suitable au-
thentication mechanisms is future work.
Figure 4: Security Levels for External Parties.
4.3 Prevention of Unsafe Information Flows
AuDroid considers an audio channel’s information flow (au-
dio flow) unsafe if produced by a low-integrity party and di-
rected to a high-integrity party, such as a flow from a mar-
ket app to a system service. Similarly, AuDroid considers an
audio flow unsafe if produced by a high-secrecy party and
directed to a low-secrecy party, such as a flow from the de-
vice owner to a market app. Finally, audio flows between
low-secrecy low-integrity parties (apps) are also considered
unsafe by AuDroid, which separate apps by assigning them
to different categories. Unsafe audio flows are shown in Fig-
ure 5, where C1 and C2 are categories assigned to apps.
Figure 5: Unsafe Audio Flows.
In AuDroid, attacks based on audio channels are prevented
by identifying and blocking unsafe information flows by en-
forcing MLS access control policies, such as Biba [12] and
Bell-LaPadula (BLP) [13]. Consequently, AuDroid prevents
any audio produced by a low-integrity party from flowing to
a high-integrity party, and any audio produced by a high-
secrecy party from flowing to a low-secrecy party. Addition-
ally, to avoid unsafe flows among apps, AuDroid prevents the
creation of audio channels between low-secrecy low-integrity
processes (apps) by leveraging the use of categories.
Extending the SELinux reference monitor is challenging
because AuDroid has to ensure complete mediation of all
security-sensitive operations [27]. For AuDroid, we must
identify the right locations to place its Audio Hooks to me-
diate every access to the microphone and speaker by any
process. There are two possible alternatives: inside the An-
droid framework/middleware or inside the Linux kernel. To
achieve complete mediation of accesses to the microphone
and speaker, which are low-level system resources, kernel
mediation would seem to be most appropriate. Unfortu-
nately, hooks inside the kernel do not have visibility into
the actual processes that are requesting access to these re-
sources. This is due to the fact that accesses to system
resources are always performed by system services (Media
Server) on behalf of the some requesting process, the one
running an app or another system service. For the micro-
phone and speaker, the Media Server provides complete me-
diation, as shown in Figure 1, because it is the only system
service allowed to access the microphone and speaker device
files, due to specific MAC rules specified by SE Android
[18]. Therefore, we extend the SELinux reference monitor
by placing hooks in the Media Server in the Android frame-
work/middleware.
4.4 Resolution of Unsafe Audio Flows
Blocking every audio flow from a high-secrecy party to a
low-secrecy party would prevent system apps and services
from performing some expected operations, such as produc-
ing a ring tone on an incoming call. Similarly, blocking ev-
ery audio flow from a low-integrity party to a high-integrity
party would prevent market apps from performing some ex-
pected operations, such as producing sound when a message
is received. To preserve these functional requirements, Au-
Droid uses resolvers to enable privileged processes to resolve
some information flow errors.
Figure 6 shows the information flows in need of resolu-
tion. To implement information flow error resolution, Au-
Droid uses a callback mechanism, as in the Android Security
Modules (ASM) [1] framework, to notify the system app or
service at risk about the information flow error. The sys-
tem app or service is provided with the identity of one or
more resolvers, known methods for preventing information
flow errors. We examine different types of resolvers in Sec-
tion 6, but one example would be to only play approved
audio files (e.g., ring tones) that do not contain secrets or
malice. Unlike ASM, only system apps and services may re-
ceive callbacks and only those currently using audio channels
are notified.
Figure 6: Audio Flows Allowed and Resolved by AuDroid
4.5 Resolution of Flows to External Parties
Resolvers can automatically resolve information flow er-
rors to/from speakers and microphones. However, some in-
formation flow errors may only be resolved by the external
party, i.e., the device owner. For example, if the device
owner uses a market app that uses the microphone (and has
sufficient Android permissions), it is not possible for a sys-
tem app or service to ensure that the device owner is safe
from eavesdropping.
To enable resolution, AuDroid creates trusted paths [15]
between the device owner and AuDroid, by implementing
mechanism similar to those supported by User-Driven Ac-
cess Control (UDAC) [6]. In UDAC, each app may choose
a trusted module to run when user interaction is required.
The trusted module can also convey the results of the user
interaction to other trusted components, such as AuDroid.
Unfortunately, to use UDAC, each app must leverage trusted
modules when user interaction is needed, but such modules
are not currently deployed and app developers may fail to
use UDAC even when such modules become available. In-
stead, in the construction of AuDroid, we modify the Media
Server to recognize when there remains an unsafe informa-
tion flow to external parties (after applying resolvers), so it
can apply a trusted module to notify and gain approval from
users. Therefore, AuDroid does not depend on untrusted
app developers. The user approval cannot change the access
control policy in a discretionary manner, it only changes the
labeling of the external party for the communication chan-
nel. An event cache is used to automatically resolve identical
information flows happening in a short time interval, which
reduces the resolution overhead and avoids bothering the
user.
AuDroid provides two mechanisms for the creation of trust-
ed paths. First, whenever a low-integrity and low-secrecy
party (i.e., a market app) asks for access to the microphone,
AuDroid requires approval by the device owner. The com-
munication is not authorized until the user allows recording
through the trusted path. AuDroid provides the user with
the information about the parties that would communicate
through the creation of the audio channel if the access re-
quest is granted. Second, AuDroid notifies the user as long
as the microphone is in use. AuDroid uses a microphone icon
on the status bar and a notification light on the front side
of the device to notify the user that the microphone is be-
ing accessed, as shown in Figure 7. The notification light
replaces the microphone icon as the notification mechanism
as soon as the screen goes off.
A recent user study found that visual notification catches
the user attention for between 64-77% of the cases [10].
Figure 7: Microphone Icon and Notification Light.
5. IMPLEMENTATION OF AuDroid
In this section, we provide details about the implementa-
tion of the AuDroid Framework based on a vanilla Android
OS (version 5.0.1 r1), obtained from the official Android
Open Source Project (AOSP) repository [23]. The AuDroid
prototype has been tested on a Nexus 5 smartphone. The
AuDroid source code and the code for the apps implementing
attacks (described in this paper) will be made available on
https://github.com/gxp18/AuDroid. The current AuDroid
prototype is implemented in less than 520 LOC in C++,
less than 130 LOC in C, and about 120 LOC in Java. Con-
sequently, the impact in terms of the customization needed
to integrate AuDroid in a vanilla Android OS distribution
is negligible. We have written a simple patch that auto-
matically integrates the additional modules into the vanilla
distribution.
An overview of the AuDroid Framework architecture is de-
picted in Figure 8. The difference between AuDroid and the
original Android Framework architecture (Figure 1) is at
the System Services layer. In AuDroid, the Media Server is
made context-aware by integrating it with the following new
additional modules: Audio Hooks, Security Level Identifier,
Reference Monitor Extension, and User Notification mod-
ules. Additional modules are shown as dashed, light-grey
boxes in Figure 8.
Figure 8: AuDroid Framework Architecture.
5.1 Audio Hooks
AuDroid makes use of four Audio Hooks to mediate access
to the microphone and speaker. It uses two hooks for each
system resource in order to capture the resource acquisition
and release. Audio Hooks are placed inside the Audio Sys-
tem module, part of theMedia Server, and located at the fol-
lowing four mediation points: AudioSystem::startInput(),
AudioSystem::stopInput(), AudioSystem::startOutput()
and AudioSystem::stopOutput(). These are the only entry
and exit points for obtaining the microphone and speaker
for any apps or other system services, as validated through
dynamic analysis of the Android framework source code and
SDK API. Each hook retrieves the PID of the calling pro-
cess which is passed, together with the mediation point, as
parameter in a call to the Security Levels Identifier module.
A code snippet of an Audio Hook is reported below:
1 pid_t pid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid();
2 int sec_l = SecurityLevelIdentifier::getLevels(pid);
3 PolicyEnforcer::enforce (sec_l , mediationPoint);
Since SELinux restricts access to the microphone or speak-
er only to the Media Server and the Audio Hooks, complete
mediation by theMedia Server would be sufficient to prevent
circumvention. We used dynamic analysis, of the Android
Framework source code and SDK API, to validate complete
mediation, checking that every access to the microphone or
speaker was accompanied by an invocation of an appropriate
Audio Hook. Retaining such logging could be used to detect
errors, if any exist.
5.2 Security Levels Identifier
The Security Levels Identifier is implemented in C++ and
uses the PID of the calling process to categorize processes
accessing the microphone or speaker, as described in Section
4.2. The Security Levels Identifier categorizes processes re-
lated to market apps as low-secrecy and low-integrity, and
processes related to system apps or services as high-secrecy
and high-integrity, in accordance with our security model.
Furthermore, the Security Levels Identifier uses information
provided by the Keyguard Manager, a module inside the An-
droid framework, to determine if the device screen is locked
or unlocked as optional mechanism to authenticate the de-
vice owner, as described in Section 4.2.
5.3 Reference Monitor Extension
The Reference Monitor Extension is a software module,
implemented in C++, in charge of enforcing the access con-
trol policy in response to calls coming from the Audio Hooks.
The Reference Monitor Extension is context-aware, in that,
it uses the security levels identified by the Security Levels
Identifier while authorizing access to the audio channels pro-
duce at runtime. Additionally, the Reference Monitor Ex-
tension can leverage resolvers whenever an information flow
violation is identified, as described in Section 4.4. When-
ever a resolver is involved, the Reference Monitor Extension
uses the callback mechanism to obtain approval from the
system app or service at risk. Finally, the Reference Mon-
itor Extension builds trusted paths with the device owner
to obtain approval for the use of the microphone by low-
secrecy low-integrity processes. Upon approval, the access
to the microphone is made visible to the user through the
notification mechanism, as described in Section 4.5.
5.4 User Notification
In AuDroid, the device owner is notified about accesses to
the microphone, by running processes, via two notification
mechanisms. The first one is the Microphone Icon that ap-
pears on the status bar anytime a process accesses the micro-
phone after being authorized by the Media Server. An icon
depicting a microphone is shown on the device system status
bar for the entire audio session, as depicted in Figure 7. By
tapping on the microphone icon the device owner obtains
further information about the app currently accessing the
microphone. The second notification consists of a blinking
notification light, on the front side of the mobile device, ac-
tivated whenever the screen goes off if a process is accessing
the microphone after being authorized by the Media Server.
These two notification mechanisms increase the device owner
awareness anytime the microphone is accessed. We rely on
the user common sense in avoiding speaking about personal
matters or sensitive information whenever access to the mi-
crophone is signaled.
6. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of AuDroid in
preventing the six types of attack scenarios for audio chan-
nels discussed in Section 2.2, examine whether 17 widely-
used apps and services can still be run effectively under Au-
Droid, and measure the performance impact of AuDroid.
6.1 Attack Prevention
Table 2 compares the effectiveness of AuDroid in prevent-
ing the six types of attack scenarios on audio channels out-
lined in Section 2.2 to Android, other related work described
in Section 7, and Simple Isolation2. AuDroid is capable of
preventing all six types of attack scenarios. Other defenses
prevent no more than two types of these attack scenarios be-
cause they lack awareness of the impact of external parties.
Further, other defenses are of limited applicability or may
often cause false positives, as described in the next section.
2No simultaneous access to the microphone and speaker by
two different processes.
Table 2: Attack Prevention Analysis
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Base Android ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Simple Isolation ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
AuDroid ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Google Voice Search bug fix ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Control Access to Speaker ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
System Services Permission △ △ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Voiceprint Recognition ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Touchless Control (Table 2 column 1) refers to the at-
tack where a malicious app makes use of an audio channel of
Type 1 to exploit a system service receiving voice commands
to perform security-sensitive operations [3, 4]. This type of
attack is prevented by Simple Isolation, because two pro-
cesses cannot access - at the same time - the microphone
and speaker. Similarly, AuDroid detects an unsafe flow from
a low-integrity process (malicious app) to a high-integrity
process (system service). Rows 4-7 show that other defense
mechanisms can prevent this attack. In particular, the △
symbol (in row 6) highlights that, a permission mechanism
used to authorize the use of System Services could prevent
the attack, if the user does not grant the permissions to use
the Media Server for a malicious app.
Keylogger (Table 2 column 2) refers to an attack where
a malicious app uses an audio channel of Type 1 to eaves-
drop the password typed by the device owner and spoken out
by the TalkBack accessibility service [3]. Simple Isolation
prevents the attack because two processes cannot access the
microphone an speaker at the same time. AuDroid prevents
the attack because a unsafe flow from a high-secrecy pro-
cess (accessibility service) to a low-secrecy process (mali-
cious app) is detected. Furthermore, the △ symbol (in row
6) highlights the fact that a permission mechanism, used to
authorize the use of System Services, could prevent the at-
tack if the user does not grant the malicious app permission
to use the Media Server.
Device Control (Table 2 column 3) is an attack per-
formed by using a malicious app running on a device as a
source of malicious voice commands (such as those reported
in Table 1) to attack another nearby device. The attack
is performed by using an audio channel of Type 2. Sim-
ple Isolation does not prevent the attack because it does
not consider audio channels involving external parties. On
the other hand, AuDroid detects the unsafe flow from a low-
integrity process to a high-integrity external party.
Speak Out (Table 2 column 4) refers to a malicious
app eavesdropping voice and sound through the device’s mi-
crophone to collect security-sensitive information, such as
private conversations, successively leaked to an adversary
through the device’s speaker as soon as the device owner,
victim of the attack, is away from the device. The adver-
sary makes use of an audio channel of Type 2 to bypass any
lock screen protection mechanism. Simple Isolation does
not prevent the attack because it does not consider audio
channels involving external parties. On the other hand, Au-
Droid detects the unsafe flow from a low-integrity process
to a high-integrity external party. Furthermore, AuDroid
prevents a malicious app from eavesdropping on the device
owner because the user approval is required before a low-
secrecy process can access the microphone.
Voice Commands (Table 2 column 5) is an attack per-
formed by an adversary directly interacting with the target
device via malicious voice commands. In this attack, the ad-
versary uses an audio channel of Type 3. Simple Isolation
does not prevent the attack because it does not consider au-
dio channels involving external parties. On the other hand,
AuDroid prevents a malicious user, different from the device
owner, from delivering voice commands to a system service,
by identifying the external party (user) as low-integrity and
the system service as high-integrity. As shown in row 7,
Voiceprint Recognition can prevent the attack, unless the
adversary replays recorded device owner voice commands.
Stealthy Recording (Table 2 column 6) refers to an at-
tack where a malicious app uses an audio channel of Type 3
to stealthily record audio through the device’s microphone
in order to eavesdrop the device owner and the surrounding
environment. AuDroid prevents a malicious app from eaves-
dropping the device owner voice because the user approval is
required before a low-secrecy process can access the device’s
microphone.
6.2 System Functionality
We next evaluate the impact of AuDroid on the ability of
apps and services to operate normally. The results of our
analysis are reported in Table 3. We evaluate AuDroid for 10
market apps and 7 system apps distributed with the Android
OS from Google. We select market apps that are among
the most popular apps available on Google Play. We also
choose market and system apps that use either the speaker
or microphone or both, as indicated by the last four rows in
Table 3.
Row 1 in Table 3 shows that, by enforcing Simple Isola-
tion, all the system and market apps would work fine al-
though interaction among apps is not allowed. For example,
the user cannot use the Voice Recorder app to tape the music
produced by the Music app. Therefore, although the system
functionality is preserved, there is an indirect impact on how
apps can interact.
We then analyze the impact of using AuDroid when MLS
is applied to enforce Biba and Bell-LaPadula. From row 2
in Table 3, we observe that two security violations are re-
ported for the Phone and Hangouts system apps, which are
due to the fact that these apps produce a sound on incoming
calls or message receptions, even when the external party is
identified as low-secrecy (i.e. device screen locked). This is
seen by AuDroid as a flow from a high-secrecy party (system
app) to a low-secrecy party (user different from the device
owner). Furthermore, from row 2, we observe two integrity
violations in correspondence of Pandora and Spotify. This
is due to the fact that these apps access the speaker to pro-
duce music and sounds, therefore AuDroid sees a flow from
a low-integrity party to a external high-integrity party. Fi-
nally, row 2 reports secrecy and integrity violations for the
remaining market apps from Viber to Call Recorder. The
integrity violations are due to the same reason explained
for Pandora and Spotify, whereas the secrecy violations are
due to the fact that AuDroid sees a flow from an external
high-secrecy party (i.e. device owner) to a low-secrecy party
(market app).
Row 3 shows how AuDroid resolves the secrecy violations
relative to the market apps by using the user approval mech-
anism. In particular, whenever a market app uses the mi-
crophone, the device owner is notified and can approve or
deny the access.
Row 4 shows the effect of using a resolver (Resolver 1)
Table 3: System Functionality Analysis
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Simple Isolation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AuDroid MLS ✓ ✓ ✓ SV SV ✓ ✓ IV IV SIV SIV SIV SIV SIV SIV SIV SIV
AuDroid User Approval ✓ ✓ ✓ SV SV ✓ ✓ IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
AuDroid Resolver 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ IV IV SIV SIV SIV SIV SIV SIV SIV SIV
AuDroid Resolver 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ SV SV ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ SV SV SV SV SV SV SV SV
AuDroid ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Requested User Approval no no no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
User Notified yes no yes yes yes yes yes no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
App uses Microphone yes no yes yes yes yes yes no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
App uses Speaker yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
1 Snapchat (Take Video)
2 Facebook (Send Voice Message)
3 Whatsapp (Send Voice Message)
4 Voice Recorder (Send Voice Message)
5 Viber (Send Voice Message)
6 Google Voice Search (Voice Search)
7 Browser (Watch Video)
8 Skype (Video Call)
9 Call Recorder (Record Phone Call)
10 Pandora (Listen to a Song)
11 Spotify (Listen to a Song)
that allows system apps, like Phone and Hangouts, to play
approved ring tones and notification sounds even when the
external party is identified as low-secrecy.
Row 5 shows the effect of using a second resolver (Resolver
2) to allow market apps, like Pandora and Viber, to play ap-
proved audio files that do not contain malice, such as ring
tones, notification sounds and sound tracks, even when the
external party is identified as high-integrity.
By combining the user approval and the resolvers, AuDroid
runs all the tested apps correctly without impact on the
system functionality, as show in row 6.
6.3 Performance Overhead
Existing benchmarks for Android, such as AM-Bench [8]
and Android Workload Suite [7], do not target apps mak-
ing extensive use of the microphone/speaker and are not
publicly available. Instead, we measured the performance
overhead introduced by AuDroid through the following 3 ex-
periments on a Nexus 5 running Android aosp-5.0.1 r1.
We first measured the overhead introduced by AuDroid
while handling each access request for the microphone and
speaker, by measuring the time interval from the time the
request is made by the process running the app to the time
the access is granted/denied by the Media Server. We found
that, on average over 10,000 requests, the original Android
system required 20.35±1.90µs to handle an access request
for the speaker and 25.36±2.01µs for the microphone. When
AuDroid is activated to mediate accesses to the microphone
and speaker, each access request for the speaker is handled
in 24.47±1.86µs and 30.11±1.99µs for the microphone. The
main reason for the overhead introduced by AuDroid was
the time necessary to recreate the context (i.e., PIDs of in-
volved processes) used to make the access control decision.
Note that enabling the AuDroid notification mechanism (icon
microphone and notification light) increased the access time
for the microphone to 38.43±2.11µs.
Second, we measured the overhead of running a sequence
of 11 well-known apps (listed on the left side of Table 3)
that create audio sessions, closing each app after running a
30s session before opening the subsequent one. We found
that both, the original Android system and AuDroid, took
591±21.93s to complete on average. Unfortunately, such a
measurement required a human in the loop, but the audio
session length reduced the variability caused by human ac-
tions. The main overhead for AuDroid incurred on opening
and closing speaker and microphone connections, which are
infrequent and low overhead operations.
Third, we used the Voice Recorder app to examine the
overhead if we tried to create audio sessions as quickly as
humanly possible on the device. To do this, the user con-
tinuously tapped on the microphone button, as quickly as
possible, to keep recording new voice messages. The experi-
ment was repeated 5 times over a duration of approximately
one minute. We registered a maximum of 21 access request-
s/minute for the microphone and a maximum of 53 access
requests/minute for the speaker. We found that, with the
highest possible number of audio sessions in a minute, both,
the original Android and AuDroid completed the task in ap-
proximately 59.54s, indicating overhead not detectable.
7. RELATED WORK
Diao et al. [4] discuss how a missing check in the Google
Voice Search (GVS) app allows any app to send an intent
and activate GVS app in Voice Dialer Mode, a mode that un-
locks the screen and allows dialing phone numbers through
voice commands. They propose enabling the GVS app to
suspend any other process trying to access the speaker while
it is actively listening for voice commands, ensuring that
GVS app receives voice commands only from the device
owner and not from audio played by third processes. The
two defense mechanisms discussed above are ad hoc solu-
tions for the GVS app, in that, they do not prevent attacks
against other apps or system services. They also suggest
that voiceprint recognition techniques [9] could be adopted
to verify the identity of the user speaking to the device, by
using biometrics voice characteristics. However, an adver-
sary can still perform replay attacks by using audio com-
mands covertly recoded during a legit interaction of the de-
vice owner with the device itself.
Jang et al. [3] suggest the use of a fine-grained access
control that gives the user the possibility to grant access
to accessibility services for assistive technology apps such as
TextToSpeech [17] and TalkBack [16]. This solution moves
the responsibility to the user on deciding if the access is
deemed security-sensitive. Unfortunately, a user might not
fully understand the security implications of granting such
access.
A different approach is proposed by Xu et al. [5], with
the design of SemaDroid, a privacy-aware sensor manage-
ment framework for smartphones. This solution allows users
to monitor sensor usage by installed apps and control the
disclosure of sensed information. SemaDroid can be effec-
tive for sensors like GPS and accelerometer that do not re-
quire perfect information, but not so for the microphone
and speaker. Adjusting the sensing parameters to reduce
the quality of sensor data or replacing this data with mock
audio data will impair the functionality of audio channels.
Researchers haven also explored improvements to access
control mechanisms, but these mechanisms fail to prevent
attacks on audio channels. The main enhancement has been
to permit more software to contribute to access control de-
cisions. The Android Security Framework (ASF) [2] allows
instantiation and deployment of different security models as
loadable modules at Android’s app layer, middleware and
kernel. AuDroid could be deployed as a loadable ASF mod-
ule, but it would require porting ASF from Android v4.5 to
Android v5.0.1. We leave it as future work. The Android
Security Module (ASM) [1] provides a wide range of security
hooks at any level of the Android Stack (Kernel, Middle-
ware, Framework, Services and even Apps). In ASM, hooks
notify the ASM bridge which in turn notifies all the ASM
apps that have explicitly registered for those specific hooks.
Therefore, ASM hooks are not suitable for implementing the
hooks used by AuDroid since, in AuDroid, apps should not
have visibility of the Audio Hooks used to mediate access to
the microphone and speaker.
User-Driven Access Control (UDAC) [6] is the most rele-
vant work for the creation of trusted paths between users and
AuDroid. In UDAC, apps use trusted Access Control Gad-
gets (ACGs) to perform user interaction, which grant apps
permission to access user-owned resources or data produced
by security-sensitive sensors. Unfortunately, switching the
SDK API to require apps to use ACGs would impact mil-
lions of apps, not be backward compatible, and lead to false
positives when errors in using ACG occur.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented AuDroid, a framework that
detects and prevents eavesdropping and confused deputy at-
tacks using audio channels. We identified three different
types of audio channels that can be exploited by an adver-
sary: (1) speaker to microphone; (2) speaker to external
party; and (3) external party to microphone. To prevent
against attacks, we argue that access control must authorize
the information flows resulting from the creation of these
audio channels. We then designed AuDroid, an extension to
the reference monitor provided by SELinux to enforce lattice
policies over dynamically-created audio channels. AuDroid
determines the labels associated with all three types of au-
dio channels, enforces information flow policies, and enables
resolution of information flow errors. To enable the reso-
lution of information flow errors, AuDroid uses callbacks to
the privileged apps and/or services that are at risk to ne-
gotiate acceptable resolvers, and uses trusted paths to the
user to notify the device owner of risks and gain approval
for the creation of audio channels. We evaluated AuDroid
against six attacks scenarios, covering the three type of au-
dio channels identified, on 17 widely-used apps, showing how
AuDroid blocks attacks based on audio channels while pre-
serving functionality for these apps.
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